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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the rationality and price responsive-
ness of sugar cane and coffee farmers in Jamaica for the period 
1960-1980. The output supplied by these farmers is modeled to 
incorporate anticipation by farmers of commodity board actions. 
The structure of constraints imposed by the rationality of these 
anticipated responses is derived and tested by means of a like-
lihood ratio test statistic. The results support the joint 
hypothesis of rationality and price responsiveness. Policy impli-
cations of the anticipated response function are also identifies. 
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND OUTPUT SUPPLY: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE SUGAR CANE 
AND COFFEE INDUSTRIES IN JAMAICA 
Economists have long agreed that farmers in Less Developed 
countries {LDC's) are responsive to price incentives. This 
consensus has developed out of the growing evidence of the last 
twenty-five years, ably summarized in the seminal work of Askari 
and cummings [3], as well as Schultz [11] and Krishna [7]. These 
results reveal that farmers respond to the expected price they 
will receive, where the expected price is formulated as an adap-
tively formed function of past prices received. An expected 
price variable is used since the prevailing price of the crop at 
planting time may not be the same as the price received at harvest. 
Whether farmers' expectations are indeed adaptive is an important 
question that has not been addressed by past researchers, with 
the exception of Shonkwiler and Emerson [12] and Eckstein [4 1 5]. 
Finally, from the point of view of marketing board policy, it is 
important to determine if farmers in fact do respond to prices 
and the way farmers form their price expectations before setting 
farmgate prices and establishing board objectives in such areas 
as gross rnarketi~g margins and foreign exchange target earnings. 
These latter goals are decidedly influenced by the output response 
of farmers to prices. 
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In this paper, we directly test whether Jamaican farmers 
respond to the expected price received and whether price expec-
tations are formed rationally. The rational expectations hypo-
thesis (REH} assumes that farmers use all information available 
to them when making forecasts about the expected price received 
(Muth) [8]. The Jamaican agricultural subsectors of sugar cane 
and coffee provide a unique opportunity for testing the REH, 
since prices are determined by a set of marketing boards for each 
of these crops and the information used in making these pricing 
decisions, such as world prices and exchange rates, is published 
and distributed to farmers at annual meetings. 
The REH theoretical model and methodology is presented in 
the next section. A full information maximum likelihood tech-
nique is utilized as the REH implies highly non-linear restric-
tions across the derived set of equations (Sargent) [10]. The 
statistical results are presented and discussed in the third 
section of the paper. The final section presents the conclusions 
and implications of our study. we conclude that farmers formu-
late expectations rationally and they do respond to the expected 
price. These findings create important implications for market-
ing board policies in a small, open economy like Jamaica. 
Analytical Framework 
Consider the general form of the output supply function 
found in the literature (Askari and cummings) [3]: 
( l ) 
( 2 ) 
( 3 ) 
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e Qt = ao + alPt + a2Qt-l + ut 
where Q is the quantity supplied; P~ is the expected farm-
gate price: u is a normally distributed random variable 
with zero mean, constant variance, and serial independence. 
P~ is unobserved but its expectation, if formed 
rationally by farmers, is based on an information set Q 
that can be expressed as: 
e Pt = E(Pt IQt-1) 
Pt, the observed farmgate price can then be decomposed 
into an expectational component (P~) and an error 
component (vt} 
e Pt : Pt + vt 
where E(P~vt) = 0 E(utut-i) = a~ for i=O 
0 for i~O 
E(vtut-i) = a~ for 
0 for i~O 0 for i;O 
i=O 
Eqs. (1) and (3} represent the structural model describing output 
supplied by farmers. These equations cannot be estimated di-
rectly due to the unobservability of P~ and lack of knowledge 
of the variables that make up Q. This can be overcome by specifi-
cation of a subset of Q so that P~ can be stated as an expression 
of exogenous and lagged endogenous variables. The expression for 
P~ can then be substituted into eqs. (1) and (3) and a set of 
estimable reduced form equations derived. The variables 
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incorporated into the informational subset of Q are drawn from 
the pricing data utilized in setting farmgate prices that mar-
keting board officials have published in interviews, newspaper 
articles and annual reports. This information is readily avail-
able to all farmers. 
For example, in the coffee sector, the Coffee Industry Board 
(CIB) announces a price at the beginning of the crop season with 
the final price the farmer receives, i.e. the announced price 
plus a "bonus" payment determined by the board at the end of the 
season. The bonus payment can vary from zero to any amount the 
board wishes to pay and therefore the farmer does not know the 
final price to be paid. We can specify this price setting behav-
ior in the coffee sector in the following manner: 
(4) e DPt = b 0 + b1EWPt + b 2EERt + b3ELMt 
Substituting eq. (4) into eqs. (1) and {3) gives the 
following set of equations: 
(6) DPt = b 0+ b1EWPt + b 2EERt + b3ELMt + vt 
where Q is the quantity of coffee in boxes (10 lbs. of 
coffee per box) delivered by farmers to the BoardJ DP is 
the difference between the announced price and the final 
price received by farmers; WP is the nominal F.O.B. price 
of coffee received by the Board in u.s. dollars~ LM is the 
percentage share of coffee sold by the Board to domestic 
coffee brewers; ER is the exchange rate ($J/$US) deflated 
by the GDP deflatorrl/ and E is the conditional expec-
tation operator. 
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Economic theory suggests that a 1 , b1 , b 2, b 3 should all 
be positive. 
For sugar cane, specification of the information subset yields: 
(7) P~ = b 0 + b1EWPt + b 2EERt + b 3ECSRt 
where WP is the nominal F.O.B. price of sugar received by 
the board in u.s. dollars; ER is the exchange rate ($J/$US) 
deflated by the GDP deflator;~/ CSR is the cane sugar 
ratio which defines how much cane is required to make a ton 
of sugar; E is the expected value operator. Again economic 
theory suggests that the signs of a1, b1, b2 are positive. 
The sign of b3 is expected to be negative because the more 
sugar cane that is required to produce one ton of sugar, the 
less the value and price of the crop. 
substituting eq. (7) into eqs. (1) - (3) yields: 
(8) Qt = a 0 + a 1b 0 + a 1b 1EWPt + a 1b 2EERt + a 1b 3ECSRt + a 2Qt-l + et 
where Q is the quantity of sugar cane in tons. 
(9) Pt = b0 + b1EWPt + b 2EERt + b 3ECSRt + zt 
Eqs. (5) - (6) and (8) - (9) represent the reduced form 
equations, with the REH imposed, of the "structural" model 
for output supply in the coffee and sugar cane sectors. This 
is termed the restricted reduced form model as the coeffi-
cients of the output equation are in the price equation.l/ 
The output and price reduced form equations without the 
rationality of farmers' expectations imposed are written 
as follows (using coffee as our example): 
(10) Qt = k0 + k1EWPt + k2EERt + k 3ELMt + kyQt-l + Ut 
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(11) Pt = b 0 + b1EWPt + b2EERt+ b 3 ELMt + vt 
A test of the REH is then a test of the equality of the following 
cross equation restrictions: 
(12) ko = ao + albo 
(13) kl = albl 
(14) k2 = alb2 
(15) k3 = alb3 
These restrictions imposed by the REH are highly nonlinear 
and hence, eqs. (5) and (6) are jointly estimated as are eqs. 
(10) and (11) by a Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) 
technique. The validity of the restrictions in eqs. (12) - (15) 
are then tested by means of a likelihood ratio test statistic 
(LRTS). The LRTS is equal to -(2 log l) where \ = Lr/Lu and 
Lr is the value of the log of the maximum likelihood of the 
restricted model and Lu is the value of the log of the maximum 
likelihood of the unrestricted model. The LRTS is distributed 
as a x2 with 2 degrees of freedom. A similar procedure is 
utilized for sugar cane. 
Empirical Results 
The restricted and unrestricted reduced form equations were 
estimated using annual data over the period 1960-1980. We handle 
the problem of the expected exogenous variables by utilizing the 
actual values lagged one period as the expectations of these 
variables are determined outside the model. The estimated para-
meters and related statistics of the reduced form equations are 
presented in Table 1 and the estimated structural parameters are 
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presented in Table 2. The LRTS is equal to 2.278 with a marginal 
significance level of .3202. The marginal significance level is 
equal to the area in the upper tail of a x2 distribution with 
two degrees of freedom marked off by the LRTS. Given this mar-
ginal significance level, the restrictions of the REH cannot be 
rejected. Coffee farmers are responsive to the expected bonus 
payment received and form such expectations rationally. The 
results for sugar cane can be interpreted in a similar fashion. 
The signs of the estimated coefficients in the restricted model, 
have the expected signs and are significantly different from zero 
except for b1. The LRTS is equal to 2.862 with a marginal signi-
ficance level of .2391 indicating that the REH cannot be rejected. 
A more relevant measure to evaluate the impact of the ex-
pected price and the variables in the information subset on out-
put supplied are the elasticities rather than the estimated co-
efficients themselves. The elasticities, reported in Table 3, 
are all derived at the point of sample means. The values for ope 
and pe are the predicted values derived from eqs. (4) and (7) 
respectively. The elasticity of supply with respect to expected 
price is .205 for coffee and .629 for sugar cane. That is, an 
expected 10% increase in the bonus payment will raise the output 
of coffee supplied to the CIB by 2.05% and a correctly antici-
pated 10% increase in sugar cane price will raise sugar cane 
output supplied by 6.29%. The calculated elasticity for coffee 
supply is much less thar. the value of .82 reported by Williams 
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£13] for the supply elasticity of Jamaican coffee over the 
period 1953-1969, however, he used an adaptive expectations 
approach and the actual final price received. 
Elasticities for the other variables can be interpreted 
in the same way. For sugar cane, a change in the cane sugar 
ratio has a strong impact on the supply response of sugar cane 
producers. This is not surprising as technological improvement 
in sugar mills in Jamaica has not been undertaken and the cane-
sugar ratio has been increasing over time (Annual Report of AICFA, 
1983). The insignificance of the coefficient for the nominal 
world price of sugar implies that farmers do not consider this 
piece of information when formulating their price expectation and 
suggests that changes in world sugar prices are not transmitted 
to farmers by the board. sugar cane farmers are then "protected" 
from some uncertainty due to world price fluctuations.!/ The 
significance of the positive coefficient for the real exchange 
rate implies that changes in macroeconomic and trade policies 
have a direct influence on output supplied. The implication of 
these findings is that the sugar Industry Authority can improve 
incentives for sugar cane farmers only if the government will 
enhance incentives faced by all exporters (i.e. a devaluation 
of the exchange rate). 
A different picture emerges in the coffee industry. The 
coefficient of the nominal world price of coffee is significant, 
while the coefficient of the exchange rate is insignificant. 
The Coffee Industry Board does pass on world price increases to 
farmers, thereby improving incentives faced by farmers, while an 
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improvement of generalized incentives for all exporters (i.e. 
exchange evaluation) has no impact on increasing output supply. 
Coffee farmers appear to realize that higher world prices are 
translated into higher bonus payments regardless of general macro-
economic conditions. However, world price fluctuations are ap-
parently passed through to the farmer who is consequently subject 
to some uncertainty.~/ 
Conclusions 
The major finding of this paper is that farmers do respond 
to the expected price received and that farmers use available 
information to formulate this expectation. Rational expectations 
of price formation by sugar cane and coffee farmers implies that 
farmers correctly anticipate board pricing decisions over time 
and adjust output supplied accordingly. 
However, extensive interviews with marketing board officials 
by the authors indicate that the positive price responsiveness of 
these farmers has not been recognized by these officials. The 
sugar and coffee marketing boards in Jamaica should consider the 
behavior of their respective farmer constituencies when setting 
farm level prices if desired foreign exchange target earnings are 
to be attained. The marketing boards cannot set farmgate prices 
independent of the farmers output response to such prices since 
farmers respond to the boards' actions.~/ These results 
indicate there is ample room for improvement in the pricing 
policy of these Boards.l/ 
!I 
1/ 
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!/ 
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FOOTNOTES 
Following Hertford, for an export crop farmer the important 
relationship is the domestic cost of producing his export 
crop compared to the value of his output valued in the domes-
tic currency. As the price (and value) of foreign exchange 
rises relative to the domestic price level, incentives to 
produce export crops are enhanced. 
See footnote 1. 
DPt-i and Pt-i are not included in the information subsets 
for sugar and coffee respectively, because these variables 
represent price expectation formation under the adaptive ex-
pectations hypothesis which cannot be nested within a model 
incorporating the rational expectations hypothesis. A re-
jection of the null hypothesis that the restrictions of the 
REH hold: cannot lead one to conclude that the adaptive ex-
pectations hypothesis or any other hypothesis is "correct". 
This is consistent with findings reported by Pollard and 
Graham [9] on price stabilization policy of marketing boards 
in Jamaica. 
See footnote 4. 
This point is exemplified in statements made by the head of 
the AICFA, after the writing of this article, which lambasted 
the current government for ignoring the sugar cane farmers in 
sugar industry policy decisions (The Daily Gleaner, December 
21, 1985 p. 3). 
Recognition of this statement has come from the current 
government (again after completion of this article) which 
has reorganized the Coffee Industry Board to improve policy 
coordination throughout the coffee industry beginning in 
1986. 
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Table 1. FIML Estimates of the Reduced Form Equations for 
Jamaican Coffee and Sugar cane Supply, 1960-1980. 
sugar cane Coffee 
output Equation Restricted Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted 
constant 
EWPt 
EERt 
ECSRt 
ELMt 
Ot-1 
Price Equation 
Constant 
EWPt 
EERt 
ECSRt 
ELMt 
L 
LRTS 
1759440 
( 776751) 
443.473 
(378.647) 
300360 
( 155308) 
-108889 
(46696.6) 
n.a. 
.4039 
( .2379) 
19.4638 
( 5.8777) 
.0048 
( .0054) 
3.2571 
( 1.9212) 
-1.1806 
( .5519) 
n.a. 
-303.833 
1498900 
(1593170) 
227.384 
(1266.96) 
348766 
( 296609) 
-76404.8 
(91569.0) 
n.a. 
.3567 
( .2578) 
26.5620 
(26.0848} 
.0085 
( .0157) 
2.5438 
( 5.7443) 
-1.8558 
( 1.7280) 
n.a. 
-302.392 
2.862 
[.2391] 
417994 
(93712.2) 
25.1082 
(11.7384) 
-1689.85 
(14854.2) 
n.a. 
653.863 
(513.144) 
-.9839 
( .2059) 
-.8525 
( 1.0907) 
.0010 
( .00018) 
-.0678 
( .6125) 
n.a. 
.0262 
( .0110) 
-247.986 
518579 
( 205471) 
7.960 
( 22.657) 
-61561.9 
( 105305) 
n.a. 
1041.08 
(1437.73) 
-1.013 
( .2534) 
-1.967 
( 2.564) 
.j)Ol2 
( .0003) 
.6640 
( 1.2670) 
n.a. 
.0208 
( .0345) 
-246.847 
2.278 
[ .3202] 
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. 
Marginal significance in brackets. 
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Table 2. FIML Estimates of the structural Models for Jamaican 
Coffee and Sugar cane supply, 1960-1980 
Parameter sugar cane 
ao -335575.6 
( 50588.9 ) 
a1 92254.4 
( 58827.0 } 
a2 .4039 
( .2379 ) 
bo 19.4638 
( 5.8777 ) 
bl .0048 
( .0054 
b2 3.2571 
( 1. 9212 
b3 -1.1806 
( .5519 
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in 
parentheses. 
Coffee 
439310 
( 76433 ) 
24997.4 
( 13326 ) 
-.9839 
( .2059 
-.8525 
( 1. 0907 
.0010 
( .00018) 
-.0678 
( .6125 
.0262 
( .0110 
- 14 -
Table 3. Derived Elasticies of output supply with Respect 
to Expected variables--Restricted Model 
Elasticity of 
Supply with 
Respect to: sugar cane 
.629 
n.a. 
n.s • 
• 206 
-.577 
n.a. 
Note: Calculated at the point of sample means 
Coffee 
n.a • 
. 205 
.182 
n.s. 
n.a • 
• 114 
